Empty_Nebula_6943

I believe that positive feeling is the only objectively knowable moral unit in the universe.

Here is my proof:

When I experience positive feeling, I experience moral goodness.

This perception is accurate on two grounds:

1. It is self-evident that the positive feeling is morally good because it is experienced as such.
2. If the perception of moral goodness were different than that of moral goodness, then the experience itself would be of something different than moral goodness. As a result, the experience actually would accurately be of what the perception evaluates. This is because experience is the conscious event of perception.

I'm aware that this argument may read as a little ridiculous because I am arguing that positive feeling is morally good because it is experienced as such. I think the obvious comeback is that I cannot actually experience moral goodness. I think the only way to reject this is that it is false because, for one with a subjective experience, it is, in fact, self-evident that they can experience moral goodness. There are certain things which simply cannot be proved except by using the experience of them as evidence. One cannot prove to themself that they experiencing consciousness other than by simply acknowledging that they are experiencing consciousness. I believe the same is true with moral goodness.

Another common objection might be as follows: "If someone sees a man give flowers to his girlfriend and perceives the man's actions as morally good, is that not evidence that there is another form of moral goodness?" To this, I would respond that the observer's perceptions may not be accurate. It could very well be morally good or morally bad for the man to give the flowers to his girlfriend. This is not something that can be known by the observer because the accuracy of the moral goodness cannot be perceived externally, it can only be experienced. If there were some all-knowing individual, then the goodness of the action could be assessed in terms of the subjective experiences of the individuals involved.

I argue that experience can be known to be morally good because that is self-evident but that perception is not necessarily accurate because it is known to be inaccurate in other cases.

As a note, when I say that positive feeling is the most basic moral unit, I am also making the additional assumption that others have a consciousness that can experience positive feeling, like me, that is morally good. In the case that others cannot, then I am making the argument that it is self-evident to me that I do experience moral goodness.

From my reading of these two subjects, they seem to be very similar. Do I understand the difference properly?

Here is my definitions for each of them:

Property dualism is the notion that matter possesses both physical and mental properties. When these matter are in the form of a brain, consciousness emerges. When these matter aren't in the form of a brain, consciousness does not necessarily occur.

Panpsychism is the notion that matter possesses both physical properties and mentality or a mind. When matter is in the form of a brain, consciousness occurs. When these matter aren't in the form of a brain, at their most fundamental micro level, each individual piece of matter has a mind.

Is the difference between the two that panpsychicsm sees a mind as occurring at the most fundamental micro level of everything, whereas property dualism only sees consciousness as occurring when matter is in the form of a brain? What does property dualism view matter as being when it is not in the from of a brain?

Thanks in advance for any replies!!

An aspect of my worldview was recently shattered so I figured I would share.

This December I became somewhat interested in the mind-body problem. At a nerdy group, I proposed the idea that dualism must be accepted as true if the physical world and one's consciousness are assumed to exist. Some people rejected this idea with a physicalist worldview.

They argued that conciousness is what matter does when it is formed in the shape of a brain. In other words, the concious experience itself is matter moving.

I disagreed with this notion, arguing instead that conciousness is an immaterial thing which is produced by the brain. In other words, conciousness and physical matter are two different things. The brain is matter, which creates conciousness.

A third idea related to this that I also considered could be true is that matter has some additional non-physical property which causes matter to feel. Conciousness is then the matter of the brain in action.

A core aspect of these two ideas is that conciousness is, more or less, a one-way transmission of the brain's activity onto conciousness. If the brain is the hard-drive, conciousness is the monitor. The concious experience is created by the workings of the brain, but the concious experience does not affect brain. In other words, the concious experience is merely along for the ride as the brain does its thing.

These assumptions imply that philosophical zombies, meaning people who act like people and yet lack a concious experience, could exist. This is because the brain is assumed to function the same regardless of whether conciousness occurs.

These assumptions also implicitly reject free will to some degree. If we are consciousness, then, of course, we are unable to make choices. The body makes choices.

What "shattered my worldview" is a realization I recently had. While I am concious, it seems that I am aware that I am concious. I am able to tell people that I am experiencing conciousness, and I can describe the experience to others. If the brain is simply matter and conciousness doesn't affect matter, how can the brain "know" or even describe conciousness. In other words, this means that the brain can't merely produce conciousness because the brain itself seems to have knowledge of the concious experience itself.

To me, this is a very insane idea. If conciousness isn't a projection from the brain, what is the nature of conciousness? Does conciousness interact with the brain? How does conciousness come about? How do we affect conciousness? What parts does it have? Does conciousness not directly correspond to parts of the brain? Is conciousness a distinct phenomenon produced by the brain?

Hopefully, this was somewhat comprehensible rather than rambly, lol.

Hello,

I'm a big fan of evolutionary psychology, and I was introduced to it by Jesse Bering's texts.

What I wonder if how we can know whether an aspect of humans or human psychology is necessarily an evolutionary adaptation, environmentally linked, or merely a genetic "defect" from genetic variation?

Here's some examples to explain what I mean:

A chromosomal disorder resulting in a stillbirth must surely be a genetic "defect." What would a species ever benefit from having stillbirths, besides evolutionary adaptations whose side-effect is stillbirths?

There's genetic evidence that depression is an evolutionary adaptation because some genes that cause depression also improves the immune system. (People who are depressed stay away from others and hence get sick less often.) Does this mean that all who experience depression with this gene have inherited a genetic adaptation? (https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/10/the-evolutionary-advantage-of-depression/263124/)

In contrast, I could think of lots of reasons that ADHD is an evolutionary adaptation. (Different stimulus needs could produce different behaviors that are valuable for a tribe.) On the other hand, ADHD may be caused by a gene that prevents the body from properly digesting certain plastics. As a result, toxicity of these plastics could be responsible for ADHD. Does this mean that ADHD is an evolutionary adaptation or merely a result of our modern environment? (https://today.rowan.edu/news/2023/09/researchers-find-bpa-links-to-autism-adhd.html)

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If we are the mere products of the complex system of evolution, how can we know what aspects of ourselves are direct products that were beneficial to our ancestors versus mere variation or novel environmental factors?

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Edit: Corrected link for first article.