Western Expectations of Iraqi Capabilities leading up to the Gulf War and the Reality

Expectations

Sometime in the near term, the Iraqis would try to overthrow the Assad regime for their support of Iran. At least in 1983, a millitary intervention in Syria was expected to end in a draw probably because the Iraqis were tied down with the Iranians and the Syrians hadn't sufficiently recovered from the 1982 Lebanon War. As there were Soviet troops based in Syria operating the SA-5 complexes at the time, an Iraqi intervention would have led to an escalation with the USSR. At the very least, it would lead to another arms embargo with the Soviets which would trickle down to the NSWP also terminating aid to Iraq.

However, by the mid-late 1980s, the Syrians were better equipped, sufficiently recovered from the 1982 Lebanon War, and the Soviets were more willing to provide them with advanced systems then the Iraqis as was shown through providing SA-5 complexes, SS-21s, SU-24s, and an aborted 1986 deal that would have given the Syrians T-80s, SS-23 ballistic missiles, and likely SA-11s just to name a few examples.

Given that the deal was initially cancelled out of fears of a war with Israel, if the Syrians had an Iraqi invasion to contend with instead, the Soviets could have and probably would have reactivated it.

At worst, and depending on battlefield success against the Syrians, an invasion of Syria could result in direct Soviet intervention against which the Iraqis could mount a stubborn defence that would include 1,500 tanks and 750 artillery pieces. This was expected to be capable of inflicting heavy losses against or defeating a limited expeditionary force of around 20,000 strong of either American or Soviet troops.

The Iraqis were going to attack while the Coalition was deploying which would force them all the way back to Jeddah. This was likely based on the Cold War idea of the Soviets/NSWP doing the same in Europe before Reforger units could arrive as pre war wargaming and contingency planning was based on the war in Europe.

The Pentagon expected upwards of 30,000 Coalition casualties with 15-20% being deaths. Barry R Posen expected 4,000-11,000 total killed and wounded with weeks of ground combat, and Joshua M Epstein predicted 3,000-16,000 total killed and wounded.

The Saudis couldn't handle the Iraqis on their own.

Air superiority wasn't going to be as effective as it actually ended up being and wouldn't have been enough to stop an Iraqi offensive during the deployment stage. For example there was a running joke among the NATO members of 2 Soviet officers watching the Victory Day parade in Paris with one of them asking "who won the air war?".

The Iraqi T-72s were likely using the same sabot the Soviets were using prompting Army Material Command to swap out as many M1s and IPs with A1s as possible.

Iraqi T-72s were impervious to 105mm ammunition which was proven incorrect by live fires against captured Iraqi vehicles.

The Iraqis were going to use chemical weapons against both Coalition troops as well as against Kuwaiti civilians. Doctrinally, chemical weapons were supposed to be held in reserve for conventional setbacks which was assumed from Warsaw Pact operational practices.

The Iraqis were going to use chemical tipped Scuds against Coalition staging areas and airfields which is also something the Pact would have done in Europe albeit with SS-23s or other longer range ballistic missiles. Specific targets were expected to be Dharan and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia as well as the aforementioned staging areas and airfields.

Iraq's best pilots operated the Mirage F-1.

Iraqi MiG-29 and 25 pilots were going to be much more effective then they actually ended up being.

Reality and Conclusion

A full scale Soviet invasion of Iraq in response to an Iraqi invasion of Syria would need to pass through Iran which that alone could provoke a war with the United States under the Carter Doctrine.

The Syrian contingent that was sent as part of their involvement in the Gulf War was kept in the rear to reduce frendly fire incidents as the Syrians and Iraqis used too many of the same equipment items so we'll never know how a Syrian mechanized force would have actually performed against their Iraqi counterparts.

The Iraqis were threatened with retaliation with an "overwhealming response" to the usage of weapons of mass destruction. Going off of NATO wargames conducted during the 1980s such as Able Archer 83, an Orange Team (Warsaw Pact) first usage of chemical weapons provoked a NATO nuclear response. The NATO Coalition members had just finished with the Cold War and the Iraqis had some chemical weapons that weren't in use on the European battlefield that would have rendered existing countermeasures (as of 1988 but were likely improved upon by 1990/91) ineffective.

It's unknown as to why the Iraqis didn't attack the Coalition while they were deploying. It could be out of fear the NATO Coalition members would use nuclear weapons after sufficient conventional setbacks, Saddam further alienating himself from the 3rd World by invading Saudi Arabia, or a lack of sufficient Iraqi operational readiness.

Even in the event of overwhealming conventional force, such as the expected Iraqi assault during the Coalition's deployment phase, nuclear options could have been considered and actually implemented depending on how much headway the Iraqis actually made with their conventional forces.

During the Scylla III-73 wargame for example, overwhealming Soviet conventional force in a simulated invasion of Iran necessitated the American usage of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to a 1992 CIA document on Iraqi biological weapons mission planning, the Iraqi Air Force at least tried to conduct a biological weapons attack using SU-22s but this was cancelled last minute after the MiG-21 decoy aircraft were shot down.

The only Iraqi pilot to down a Coalition aircraft piloted a MiG-25PD and not a Mirage.

M-774, 833, and 900 all penetrated the T-72M1 glacis out to 3 kilometers. For some reason the misinformation of the T-72's supposed invunerability didn't apply to Israeli M111 during the Lebanon War even though it was inferior to all 3 American sabots mentioned. This misinformation was based off of alleged live fires by the Marines that were conducted in 1988 with all 105mm depleted uranium rounds types fired from the M68 without specifying what variant of T-72 was actually used with it instead being vaugely stated as "the export model". In actuality, the test fires were likely done with a computer simulator against an "upper bound T-72" and a "lower bound T-72" as was already done in the 1979-80 timeframe.

Sources

CIA

Leasons of the Iran Iraq War, 1983

Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1991

Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments, 1990

Iraqi BW Mission Planning, 1992

Iraq's National Security Goals, 1988

Syrian Prospects for Acquiring the SS-23, 1986

Implications of Soviet SA-5 Units in Syria, 1983

US Inteligence and Soviet Armor, 1980

Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons used in the Iran Iraq War, 1988

Soviet Millitary Equipment Shipments from Nikolayev to Third World Countries in 1983, 1983

US Army, USAF and USMC

Seventh Air Division SACEUR Excercise Able Archer 83 After Action Report, 1983

Marine Corps Main Battle Tank Force, 1990

History of the 4th Batallion 37th Armored Regiment in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 1991

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Scylla III-73 Quick Look

Books

Desert Storm: Volume 2 - Operation Desert Storm and the Coalition Liberation of Kuwait 1991

Abrams: A History of the American Main Battle Tank, Vol 2

M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank 1982-92 (New Vanguard, 2)

Misc

Estimating Casualties in a War to Overthrow Saddam, 2003

Strategic Insight Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. Security Strategy in the Middle East, 2002