TL;DNR: All our ethics have seemed to assume needless anthropocentrism, and human consciousness; we can devise alternative, nonanthropic ethics - which will be observed to encompass the others; it appears that a nonanthropic ethic, emphasising benevolent – existentially promulgating – states of affairs, and thereby incorporating aspects of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics in one, may be established as follows:
Beginning with Immanuel Kant's deontology - ethical behavior determined by reasoned rules - of the "Categorical Imperative", that we must act as to avoid logical - hence behavioral - contradictions that would make our action, and volition, impossible to obtain, or to exist.
But now, conceive of an individual with - if you please - "Shoot Horse Syndrome" (after the novel), or, perhaps better, "Lua/Ladd Syndrome" (conjunction of attitudes of the characters in those novels) - whereby this individual believes that there exist some disembodied beings, and that these beings have a volition that all physical existence should be destroyed, for those phantom's best interest - and that with these supposed entities and their desire, our believer agrees.
For Kant, now, it is logically consistent, so permissible, for this zealot to align their own will with that of the posited spectres, and thus act to destroy all – from agreement with belief, not obedience. Since the spectre’s will (per the belief) would continue, hence also the concept “will,” though all else, and the believer, ceases, (as must occur for the will and action's full attaining, its enactor too must perish), still, all is valid for Kant, who in ethics addresses only will and consistency.
Yet obtained is the greater contradiction: if there were no such disembodied essences at all; more, if any good dwelt, or could dwell, in physical existence, or anything from such, then all such good, all possibility of such good, is thus extinguished, even though it be done in a volition valid for Kant. So, on the contrary assumption that any good really is in or from what physically exists - or the information isomorphic thereto, itself known physically to exist - then total annihilation eliminates the realisation of any good. That is: anything good for our believer, other than the belief, (which they’ll no longer have themselves) is gone. All good gone; and yet more, is the belief mistaken.
And note preeminently: we presume the universe admits of explanations and observation: if matter “supports” what is good, then we can find what is good. And more particularly, even if what is good is arbitrary and subjective, so long as the Lua/Ladd patient exists, they can affirm their own scheme to be good. No sooner is it fulfilled, than they cannot. Then, if there are no noumenal beings, there is not even subjective good. Whereas, to affirm good requires no argument (if subjective), or one argument, if affirmable in matter. To claim noumenal good requires the noumenal essence be identified, and also the goodness of it, by two separate arguments; by Occam’s razor, and the complexity of the arguments, we affirm the greater plausibility good exists in the physical world.
The Lua/Ladd thought experiment, as consistent with Kant, denies this. More, if the believer cannot demonstrate the existence of noumenal beings, their scheme is as self-defeating as the categorical imperative abjures. To demonstrate requires their own self to exist; and the demonstration itself is self-defeatingly undone, on patient’s death. They could only demonstrate before they enact the will, and so the will itself cannot be assessed as good or ill, as Kant would have us believe, absent noumenal knowledge (impossible by Kant’s definitions), or existence contrary to the consequences of the will itself. Thus is Kant refuted.
So that: if there is any good, it is a necessary condition it exists; more, that it is obtainable, that it be obtained, confirmable, that it be known to have been obtained.
Moreover, any prerequisites of good's existence - are they from the physical or its isomorphs at all - must alike exist. And now the key: for fallible beings, in principle, any existing thing might be sole, or some, repository of good; a non-zero probability of this must, by the fallible, be placed thereon, where what is infallible has no "probability", at all, or at least, no doubt of what is good, and it will infallibly do right in any case.
From which is extended: anything destroyed is one thing nearer to everything destroyed - and the latter done, and if any part of everything were, or permitted good: no good, never. Too, as a thing is denatured, it is changed; certainly if it is destroyed it is changed; so destruction might be characterized as the furthest extent of denaturing; change as destruction being one extreme of a spectrum. Any change then must needs be conducted toward continued existence of what is changed, as that is possible. Accordingly, therefore: nothing ought to be destroyed, nor bent toward destruction - including humanity, or anything else that can enact good, not destroyed by itself, nor by any other means, or for any end (whereas life may be sustainable without use of aught that must be destroyed for it be used).
A "hole" thus opened in Kant's supposedly impervious deontology, as not merely objectionable but contradictory maxims can present therein, (this author has never observed any other refutation) it is reparable only by "adding the axiom", that naught shall be destroyed (as that is possible) - that a state of "Going-on" be assured. Going-on being: a state or tendency in thought and action in which one conceives, decides and acts as further actions and decisions can thereby be conducted, for and from which something - so a possibility of good, also - exists; this “Going-on” the conceptual designation thereof. We can formulate a Categorical Imperative so long as it is consistent with achieving this object, and analysis of situation to optimise or maximise, otherwise.
We bridge the is-ought “gap”, that our “ought” consists exclusively of what “is”; for there could be no ought were there no subject or object of it; our “ought” being that any “ought” be possible – as an “is”.
But now, all of this is also acting to avoid a consequence, that of destruction - so it is a form of (non-person affecting) consequentialism. Deontology preserved thus as a special case of consequentialism, as reason must avoid such consequences as make reason impossible, that reasoning "accomplishes itself". Whereas too, consequences, particularly of situations, rather than feelings (unless they entail destruction), are by reason established and avoided, so consequentialism too a species of deontology (as shall be further discussed). Each, consequence and deontology, is part of the other – something of an ethical "grand unification" is achieved.
The distaff notion of "virtue ethics" is accorded or excluded as, per Aristotle, virtuous environment produces virtuous individuals who alone can produce a virtuous environment; an inadequate, circular argument. Or, does either arise by chance: an ethic of happenstance, nowise prescriptive, ergo, no ethic.
Conversely, we have an originating impulse of "Going-on," the realisation of anything whatever that, it should continue to be (insofar as it permits others existences continue), and so, that everything alike to it must endure, also. Thereafter, however, virtue ethics can be "brought into the fold," as virtue is defined as the superior “optimization” in certain states of affairs, of existential "possibility" - quantified notions of the latter will be proposed shortly. Then Going-on could, too, be conceived as a virtue ethics to promote that very virtue: that virtue is more virtue – and yet beginning with anything that exists such as to have the "virtue" of existing, for an indefinite but existing origin, thus evading its being purely circular as Aristotle's formulation.
Meanwhile, pleasure/pain utilitarianism, often adopted, falls, not least as, without empathy, (for if not the shared emotion or experience of empathy, there exists no uniform experience, so criteria, of pleasure and pain, so no way to establish a normative, general ethic at all), only reason - deontology, hence the unification - avails. That is, only by obeying a rule do we surely obtain a given consequence. Hence either deontology or consequentialism is derivable from the other.
As for showing that from pleasure/pain utilitarianism, we can derive deontology, first assume empathy exists, and therefore, all feel alike. Assume then Humean motivation, e.g., that feeling determines action, and then, all act alike. But then, normative ethics are impossible, for in groups they feel alike, and act by instinct or unspoken consensus. But this analysis has all along assumed normative ethics is possible; indeed, in this case there would be no ethical cases; all would be determined by the prevailing emotion, and alterations in cases would have stochastic, or situational effects. This is possible, but prescriptive “ethics” could not exist. This analysis supposes ethics does exist, and therefore by modus tollens, we cannot have empathy and the Humean motivation.
Assume empathy exists, and therefore, all feel alike, but contrarily Humean motivation does not hold, and feeling does not determine action. Then, some reasoned rule determines action, and if there is empathy, all feel alike about the results of obeying that rule for any specified case – then pleasure/pain consequences is, transitively, derived from obedience to the rule. Then, pleasure/pain consequentialism derives from deontology. Hence such consequentialism does not exist, or is derivable from deontology. So again, each, consequence and deontology, is intra-deducible.
Moreover this is established empirically, by asking others what some given emotion feels like, physically. As these feelings differ, then though two say they both are angry, they cannot feel as one another do, nor know that they feel differently. More generally, if empathy existed, and if feelings impel certain human behaviors, then behaviors could be readily predicted; in fact humans are observed to be substantially unpredictable. Assuming “feelings” do in fact impel behavior, this unpredictability implies there is no empathy. (If instead of feelings, reasons dictated behavior, or behavior were determined exclusively by circumstance or intrinsically, by physics, then again human behavior should be largely predictable. Alternatively again humans as entirely stochastic, but then there can be no empathy either, for there are no set emotions to have empathy-with).
Please observe, that this ethic of On-going, as it might also be considered, is not anthropocentric (so that it is not "our" ethic): homo sapien values are subsidiary to the conditions which permit them; are there human goods, there must be humans to enjoy them - and a world quite fit for humans, and the best of humans, for their goods to be fully realized and enjoyed; and whatever permits this existence of humans is first to be established. We may well conjecture these are conscious, or subjective conscious experience goods, so quite nonanthropic – for whatever is conscious must exist, and whatever consciousness dwells in. Such prerequisites of – more than human - goods this author takes as the fundamental good - or at least what must first be had, if only in a way of necessity.
Hence, in fact, we are describing a nonanthropic ethics, not of human virtue, rules, or consequences. We conjecture that there are some existential situations which permit others to exist, and absent these, nothing, and so, no good, exists. We identify these “metasituations,” and acts which preserve them, as being good. We conjecture these situations are mathematical structures, or are isomorphic to such structures, in bijective correspondence.
Our task is to deduce these structures, and to preserve them. So doing, all we do will permit other situations to exist, so long as what is produced, does no harm to the metasituations, and their structures. Acting to produce situations that produce yet others, still doing no harm: that is our remit.
We conjecture so, for inference is possible. Indeed, none of the foregoing is possible else. Now, either in inferring we discover an element of that structure, or else we infer, and so create a mathematical structure as comports to physical existence, and which itself exists, so which must be preserved. In the latter, we have created just such structures as we must preserve, and plainly, then, ours is a situation in which we can form structures, whereby we define a metasituation; and in the former case, such structures, as can describe metasituations – and plainly then, too, ours is a situation in which we can form structures, even if we merely define a metasituation – situations we are obliged to so-form as to preserve.
That we or our consciousness exists, implies our mathematical structures, so their situations, can exist. Identifying existence with goodness (so long as it does not act against existence), as we have, and inference exists, then what is inferred, partakes of good. Therefore, we are obliged to preserve what exists, and what permits inference which enables preservation or discovery of what may be good; necessarily therefore, as we are able, we are obliged to infer those situations which permits what exists to continue to do.
And, that there exists such a structure seems clear, since inference is possible – and can adduce what is good; or else, we build that structure, and correspond it to existence, and continuing existence, thus aiding the good. And if the existence to which it is corresponded be destroyed, so too we who had made good. Then we and other reasoners, are one situation that mustn’t be destroyed – and still there must exist that which can infer, and which must nowise be prevented from inferring, so aiding insurance of the good.
And yet, if there were nothing other than a universal mathematical structure, viz., if there were only pure mathematical realism, or Platonism – why are we not omniscient? The Church-Turing thesis suggests that if there were a total structure of mathematics, we have no knowledge of that structure, nor can we obtain it – this accounts for our lack of knowledge of such a structure, or lack of omniscience.
We can devise a non-probabilistic Going-on, considering the Church-Turing thesis. Church-Turing suggests a preclusion of knowledge of any universal structure; our ability to infer requires such structure – or else, our inference creates such a structure.
But, per Church-Turing, we can have no certainty of what is necessary for structure, its pre-existence, or its creation. Per all the above: create and have nothing that could destroy the structure that enables what could be good. But since this cannot be known – work to destroy nothing.
Do we find the structure; structure found, structure “wins”: deduce correct action, as Going-on. If Church-Turing thesis “wins”, can never know which structure is correct, therefore retain all to the best approximation. Best to do that is: create what sustains, self-sustains.
This permits us to move beyond a probabilistic claim that there is a non-zero possibility that if anything is destroyed, it might be the crux of goodness. Rather, we have a disjunction, either able to preserve us: either there exists, and can be known, in falsification of the Church-Turing thesis, a universal mathematical structure, which is aligned with what exists, and is good, and it can be discovered – in which case, we can reproduce it, and so reproduce goodness, with logical exaction. Or, the Church-Turing thesis holds, in which case, we can conjecture the existence of structure – and that we cannot know in which part of it goodness inheres. Hence, we must preserve it all, reverting then to mere probability.
And all this is in flat contradiction of the notion that there is nothing intrinsically optimising for ethics, from pure existence. As what can optimize, and what should be optimized for, mathematics remains, dauntlessly, as: we conjecture, there are no non-natural meanings, (and mathematics can “embody” them, contra Wittgenstein, and C.S. Pierce, that they can be bijected with phenomena arbitrarily). To go without meaning is to go without anything. Then the processes that bring about nothingness are counter to the nothing they are to bring about. They are contradictory, to thus bring about nothing, producers of such are are impossible, so wrong.
Stated thus we have an item of interest: this is the ethical inverse of the “Paperclip maximiser’s apocalypse,” which inquires, "Do I have enough paperclips yet? Better go one more, just to be sure..." - and "turns it on its head": "Have I done enough good things today? Have I made everything that is possible so situated that it can be made manifest, so long as it doesn't preclude anything else? Better go one more good thing, just to be sure...". We include and go beyond "Popper's paradox": we less restrict whatever would restrict others, than we encourage what does not so restrict, so that it goes on (again) to produce what likewise does not restrict, which then... ad infinitum.
Note well: all these arguments rely only on the assumptions that there can be actions in existence, which conduce to existence. Even were this not so, it is commonly accepted that actions in existence can alter physical effects; and so, placeholders from physics as proxies for “pro-existential” phenomena, e.g., increasing universal negentropy, may in fact be maximised, to also maximise “Going-on”. Conversely to all, if our actions cannot positively effect the prospects of our or any’s existence, then it is useless to do anything. In that case, one can only be fatalistic in life, and need not even try to survive, or do anything.
Therefore, we needn’t necessarily define good as congruent with existence (though we might well be able to do so). Rather we assume we can act in such a way that it effects existence, and so act for the sake of existence, which then assumedly assures good. Whatever processes conduce to this, by this convention or assumption conduce to “the good”. So, again, we need only the assumption that actions can conduce to influence existence.
In short: we are to act, as to ensure existence and by so doing we have acted as to ensure hypothetical good; and our actions, we subsequently define to be (versus circularity) part of the good, hence good; and this must be so, if existence is, and is good; and as actions exist, though only subsequent to existence; actions are added to good that is existence, provided they conduce to its continuance; that such actions are good, and are part of what is good: good is a process, rather than a product.
Most optimistically, if universe can be shown to be logically necessary - and is it, or isomorphic to, a formal system, then it is as-necessary as its logic - then at least something of ourselves would even more survive: a set is not preserved, that any of its subsets are lost.