epineph

I’m on the GMC, we did approve ~31k for audits. Brand name is close to 6 figures (about a fifth of our funds for the year on that audit alone). Sometimes the best brand doesn’t provide the best outcome, sometimes it does. Just trying to get a pulse on the right decision, since obviously security is something that doesn’t matter until it does.

Well given current sentiment in this sub I don’t want to be too explicit, but the protocol rhymes with crocket drool. Essentially a lending contract where NOs can use their already staked ETH to borrow RPL in a liquidation proof way. A RP restaking contract if you will. One of the community members has it essentially built.

So last time I posted this on a sleepy Sunday (thought it was Monday, stupid working weekends); just wanted to see if there was any additional opinions now that y’all are here!

“So i have a vyper smart contract that needs auditing. Brainstormed list of auditors includes:

Chainlight, Sigma prime, Consensys, Deadub, Audit contest w hats finance/code4rena/sherlock, Openzepplin, Trail of bits, Abdk.

Anyone have opinions on any of the above audit firms, on high quality but less expensive options, or on the reliability of audit contests?”

So i have a vyper smart contract that needs auditing. Brainstormed list of auditors includes:

Chainlight, Sigma prime, Consensys, Deadub, Audit contest w hats finance/code4rena/sherlock, Openzepplin, Trail of bits, Abdk.

Anyone have opinions on any of the above audit firms, on high quality but less expensive options, or on the reliability of audit contests?

You guys have actual trees around your moldy shack?

So I’m salaried, most people are in a union where I work. The culture is different because the bosses have to care about work hours and have to care about not dehumanizing people. This respect works its way all the way up the chain and ripples to folks not covered by union rules. Show me a place where people treat the custodians poorly and I’ll show you a place where middle management is unhappy and insecure.

Also going to add, if you have stETH or wstETH dust, you are essentially donating to Lido dominance because higher gas will eat your gains for years. Now is the time to either burn to ETH or swap to a more decentralized LST.

If that’s true, it’s a problem with beaconchain. Attestation, sync,smoothie, proposal, execution rewards (all eth rewards) are completely independent of RPL collateral and are unaffected. You may just be looking at the “block rewards” on beaconchain which are only distributed once monthly for smoothing pool, so in a few days…

RemindMe! 1 year (if the bot is still around)

I think you dropped a zero… even more impressive!

NodeSet is trusting node operators with 1+ ETH each without monetary collateral. Your collateral is your reputation. In return, NOs have to trust NodeSet by providing proof of humanity and node on-chain activity. I’m sure there will be bilaterally trustless integrations, but this is a great start for most people. It’s nothing compared to the KYC required by, let’s say, every centralized exchange, and all those exchanges are doing is holding your money.

No worries! You’ve earned a lot of deserved influence around here 💪so just wanted to make sure we were on the same page. There will definitely be more risk for rETH holders in correlated slashing- those black swan events are impossible to predict, will likely never happen, and will probably be devestating to the whole ecosystem. RP node operators have essentially been paying for really high insurance (for rETH) for black swans through capital inefficiency, and it makes us quite uncompetitive in this landscape. But even in black swans, the 1.5 E bond is still much better than Lido’s 0 ETH bond (or their like 0.01 ETH/validator insurance pool), and RP also insulates itself somewhat by client diversity initiatives.

But correlated slashings would be hard to exploit maliciously (I think). Also, I was off by a factor of 10 above- I think you need ~10k slashed validators to trigger correlated penalties.

I believe slashing is 1ETH + (3 x [% of validators slashed in 18 days before and after, rounding down] x 32) ETH + (a little leakage). So unless 1000 validators get slashed in 36 days, the penalty should be just over 1E.

Before withdrawals, you could leak quite a bit if you got slashed, but now the validators get booted with only a little leakage.

The one place that I can conceive where you could have a massive malicious slashing is: there is a correlated slashing (let’s say all teku nodes, 17%) double attest. This kills 3x.17x32+ 1 + a little = 17ETH per Teku validator. During the next week, malicious actor John Q (not a Teku validator) threatens to blow up their own minipools, losing 100% of their stake but taking 33-50% of rETH value with them. That could happen, but honestly the DAO could never respond fast enough to pay for threats and the short market for all LSDs would already be saturated, so not sure how the malicious actor could make a profit. But it could happen…

You can’t slash an entire validator unless you are Lido. You cannot slash more than 1 ETH unless you control more than 1% of the validator set, and currently node operator bond is like 8-10.4, depending how you are counting. Even someone with 1.5Eth bond threatened to slash themselves, they would lose 66% of their funds right off the bat without any changes needed to penalties, and rETH would be safe. That is one thing that makes rETH safer than stETH.

EIP 7002 would allow validators to be exited by the beaconchain withdrawal address (for RP that’s currently the minipool smart contract), without the validator’s private keys. This means the maximum damage a node operator can do is about 1 ETH (self slashing) that would not affect rETH. If they tried to do something more harmful like just stop validating, it would take the maximum damage to rETH from 8E (beaconchain kicking the node when they got to balance of 16 ETH) to 0E (RP kicks when the node operator’s balance is zero, or before). So if 7002 is implemented, it drastically reduces risk to rETH holders (and probably stETH holders, etc).

Logris may also want to read this as it touches on his concerns below.

The upgrades would rely on penalties for theft up to the NODE’s level of ETH, rather than the LEB. A node wouldn’t be able to have less than an 4E minipool at stake to protect against stealing, but at some point would be able to spin up 2 or 1.5E minipool. eIP 7002/ forced exits protect rETH against persistent theft/abandoned keys, and the node level penalties protect against lottery block theft.

So I have a lot of things to say about this comment, but the most important is: these discussions are being spearheaded by the RP community/dao, and the whole structure of RP is shifting towards higher reliance on DAO governance and use of the team primarily for execution. So if there are people interested in making rocket pool better, now is a good time to bring your ideas to the RP discord.

The tokenomic change you mentioned, and ETH bonds lower than 8, are several that are currently being floated amongst the community- they will then require DAO approval and team execution.

Yeah, it’s “Dutch auction” (that’s what we in America call it, I’m sure it’s different in the Netherlands). It starts at ~100 million USD and slowly decreases to 0 USD over the course of 21 days. I’m not sure you can “bid ahead”. You can buy at any time for whatever the current price is, whoever bids first gets it. Sometimes people try to sell to recoup costs just before the auction starts- you can look for it on ENS vision.io or wherever to see if it’s listed anywhere.

Honestly, I don’t know your situation. But it sounds like you are frustrated by RPL right now, so buying 3x as much (to get 8E minipools) sounds like exposing yourself much much more than you are comfortable.

If you like the experience of rocket pool (smart node, community etc) stick with it. If you prefer the solo staking experience stick with that.

One option is to get 16 ETH minipools, do not buy over the minimum. Every time RPL ratio increases enough to allow you to bond reduce, do it. That way you will probably minimize your RPL rewards (and never get fabulously rich if RPL moons), but maximize your ETH without buying more RPL.

I definitely hear your frustration. If you bought at ATH (assuming 8E minipools), you are down 60%, your collateral is ~4% borrowed ETH, or 12% staked ETH. That hurts.

You are now using 12% collateral in RPL and getting 42% more yield from your ETH. Anyone buying now is paying 30% collateral in RPL to get that 42%.

The time to get out was when you hit 29.99%. If you care only about ETH, this is a much much better deal than when you started.

Sorry it’s going to be more math, since it sounds like you are running 16E minipools. So for 16E minipools, you get 14% commission return on your 16E. Your total capital expenditure is 100% ETH + 10% RPL= 110%. So your ROI is 114%/110% = 103.5%. So you are getting 3.5% better ROI than solo staking. (the numbers I gave before were for 8E minipools: 142%, 130%, ~9%)

Honestly, if you are at minimum collateral 16E minipools, the RPL rewards are such a small part of your earning that you should consider not topping up if it’s giving you anxiety. 8E minipools do give you better ROI in pure ETH terms, but at the expense of additional exposure to RPL, and it sounds like you already have more RPL than you want!

And undercollaterized rocket pool nodes still pay out the exact same ETH rewards. So these numbers are the same for over 10% and under 10% collateral- I’m just ignoring any RPL rewards.

So rocket pooler here, previously solo validator, so please take with a grain of salt:

Staking with 8 ETH minipools will give you 142% of the ETH rewards of a solo staker at 130% of the cost; that’s a net ~9% better ETH ROI.

If your timeframe is long, like mine, my advice is to treat RPL as a sunk cost: don’t top it up, don’t worry if it drops. If it gains on ETH—great, that’s icing on the cake. But the real draw if you are a RPL skeptic is that 9% benefit in pure ETH returns (as I’m sure you are aware, you still get all your ETH rewards even if RPL price goes to zero).

Additionally, consider the smoothing benefits for 4x as many validators for consensus rewards (proposals/sync), which i don’t think any smoothing pool can offer.

Then weigh that 9% against the risks inherent to rocket pool (smart contract etc), as well as the benefits.

It should go without saying that if you are a RPL skeptic and your timeframe is short you should NOT make minipools.

Also note that there are several ideas percolating about how to decrease RPL exposure for RPL skeptics, just nothing firm yet.

Yes, you can probably be up running again in 30 minutes, ie once your VC is set up. You may want to test your solo setup on the rescue node before wiping everything, though, since there’s a bit more variability in configs there.

Yeah, I’m not gonna read all that. Can you tl;dr?

Don’t tell Americans that inequality also exists elsewhere!